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Abstract: Inequity aversion and reciprocity have been identified as two primary 
motivations underlying human decision making. However, because income and wealth 
inequality exist to some degree in all societies, these two key motivations can point to 
different decisions. In particular, when a beneficiary is less wealthy than a benefactor, a 
reciprocal action can lead to greater inequality. In this paper we report data from a trust 
game variant where trustees’ responses to kind intentions generate inequality in favor of 
investors. In relation to a standard trust game treatment where trustees’ responses reduce 
inequality, the proportion of non-reciprocal decisions is twice as large when reciprocity 
promotes inequality. Moreover, we find investors expect that this will be the case. 
Overall, although both motives clearly play a role, we found strong evidence for 
inequality aversion. Our results call attention to the potential importance of inequality in 
principal-agent relationships, and have important implications for designing policies 
aimed at promoting cooperation. 
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I. Introduction 
Research in economics, psychology, and sociology provides compelling evidence that 
people often make decisions inconsistent with monetary earnings-maximization. From 
this observation has emerged a substantial empirical and theoretical literature seeking to 
improve our understanding of human decision making. This literature points to inequity 
aversion and reciprocity as important motivations underlying human decisions (see, Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000). These two motives, however, do not always offer convergent 
implications for decision-making. In particular, if a beneficiary is less wealthy than his 
benefactor, his reciprocal action might actually increase inequality. Given that inequality 
is ubiquitous in human societies in general, and that it typically exists in principal-agent 
relationships in particular, it is perhaps surprising that little previous research has 
attempted to characterize decision making when equality and reciprocity are in conflict. 
To our knowledge, this paper provides the first direct evidence on decision making in 
environments where inequality aversion and reciprocity have divergent behavioral 
implications.  
 Plentiful evidence shows that humans are averse to inequitable outcomes 
(Walster, Walster and Berscheid, 1978), and are willing to incur costs to reduce 
inequality between themselves and their counterparts (see. Güth, et al.,1982).  On the 
other hand, substantial evidence also reveals that inequality aversion cannot fully explain 
behavior, and that intention as well as expectations about others’ behavior, also matter 
(e.g. Blount, 1995; Charness and Haruvy, 2002; Cox, 2004; Andreoni, Brown and 
Vesterlund, 2002; Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels, 2003;  Houser, et al., 2008;  Falk, Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2008; Bicchieri and Chavez, 2008). For example, people tend to 
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respond more negatively to an unequal outcome that is the result of an intentional choice 
than to an unequal outcome brought about by nature. Individuals seem disposed to 
positively reciprocate kind intentions, and to display negative reciprocity in response to 
hostile intentions.  This is the case even when the reciprocal acts yield no future or 
current monetary payoffs and might even be costly (Fehr and Gächter, 2000).  
Reciprocity relationships between principals and agents have been widely studied. 
Agents’ reciprocating the good intentions of principals plays an important role in 
promoting cooperative relationships in economic exchanges (Berg, Dickhaut and 
McCabe, 1995).  On the other hand, a principal (e.g. an employer) might often be 
wealthier than his agent, so that reciprocation would also increase the wealth or earnings 
inequality between them.  In this case one’s propensity to reciprocate could potentially be 
reduced, thus undermining mutual trust. Understanding how people behave when equality 
and reciprocity motives are at odds is important for designing institutions or policies that 
promote public cooperation and trust. Previous research aimed studying these two 
motives, however, cannot inform behavior under this conflict. 
This paper focuses on the case where reciprocating kind intentions (i.e., positive 
reciprocity) is at odds with inequality aversion. Our baseline experiment is similar to a 
standard trust game. An investor and a trustee are both given the same initial endowment. 
The investor decides whether to transfer a preset amount to the trustee. The trustee 
receives the tripled transfer amount and decides whether to transfer back any amount to 
the investor. In this case, any reciprocal return from the trustee to the investor that is less 
than or equal to two-third of the tripled transfer amount also reduces inequality.  
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In our second treatment, asymmetry treatment, the trustee receives the same 
endowment as in the baseline treatment, but the investor is given relatively more, so that 
both investor and trustee earn equal amounts in the event that the investor decides to 
transfer a preset amount and the trustee returns zero. Thus, any positive return by the 
trustee increases inequality. By comparing the trustees’ decisions between these two 
treatments we found strong evidence for inequality aversion although both motives 
clearly play a role1. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss related literature 
in section II. Our experimental design is presented in section III. Section IV defines 
reciprocity, inequality aversion and what each motive predicts in our experiment. 
Sections V and VI report and discuss the results, respectively. 
 
II. Background 
II.1. Theories of Reciprocity and Inequity Aversion 
Over the past decades, experimental data have repeatedly shown that subjects’ decisions 
often violate the common auxiliary hypothesis of monetary payoffs maximization. In 
ultimatum games, for example, a proposer suggests how to split a certain amount of 
money and a responder decides whether to accept or reject the offer.  It turns out that 
responders often reject selfish offers, with the result that both players get nothing (Güth 
et al., 1982).  
                                                 
1 Charness and Rabin (2002) conducted a series of experiments to differentiate motives including social 
welfare, reciprocity and difference aversion (similar to the inequality aversion we study here). They found 
that individuals’ behavior in some of the games suggests that people are willing to sacrifice inequality 
aversion to reciprocate good intentions if reciprocity is not costly to them, i.e., if reciprocating does not 
reduce their payoffs. In this paper, as we discuss later on, reciprocity is defined as costly behavior.  
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In a one-shot trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995), both investor and 
trustee receive an equal endowment, e.g., $10. The investor first decides how much of her 
endowment to transfer to the trustee, who then receives the tripled transfer amount. After 
receiving it, the trustee decides how much of the tripled transfer amount to send back to 
the investor. It has been found that investors typically transfer a positive amount and that 
trustees typically return at least the amount transferred (Camerer, 2003).  
Scholars have developed a number of economic models to explain these 
observations. Inequality aversion models argue that a person’s utility depends not only on 
his monetary payoff but also on other individuals’ monetary payoffs in relation to his 
own.  In this context, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) assume that the disutility of inequality 
is symmetric regardless of who receives the higher payoffs. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
instead argue that individuals have a stronger aversion to disadvantageous (i.e., one has 
less than others) inequality than to advantageous inequality (also see, Loewenstein, 
Thompson and Bazerman, 1989). 
Whereas models of inequality aversion focus exclusively on outcomes, reciprocity 
models also take intentions into account. Reciprocity means that one responds to 
perceived kindness with kindness (i.e., positive reciprocity) and to perceived spite with 
spite (i.e., negative reciprocity). In Rabin (1993), reciprocity affects decisions and, one’s 
payoff depends not only on one’s actions, but also on one’s beliefs regarding the other 
party’s kindness or lack thereof.2  
Since reciprocity is related to kindness, it is important to be clear about what we 
mean by kindness. According to Rabin (1993), a player i is kind if she believes that her 
                                                 
2 See also Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for a similar model for extensive form games. 
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choice will give player j a payoff that exceeds the fair payoff.3  For player i, the perceived 
kindness of j is defined as follows: player i believes player j is kind to the extent that, 
given the belief of player i about the strategy choice of player j, player i believes that 
player j believes he/she is granting i a payoff higher than the fair payoff. The exact 
definition of kindness varies in the literature. For example, Falk and Fischbacher (2006) 
combine concerns for outcome equity with reciprocity. In their model, player i believes 
that j is acting kindly/unkindly if she thinks that j wants her to get more/less than j keeps 
for herself. 
 
II.2. Evidence of Reciprocity and Inequity Aversion 
In traditional games, such as the standard trust and ultimatum games, an unequal outcome 
is often the result of a player’s choice. Thus, sensitivity to intentions coexists with 
aversion to unequal payoff distributions. Consequently, these games cannot offer 
sufficient evidence to differentiate between these two motives (and the respective 
theories). Recently, however, experiments have been designed to isolate one motive from 
the other. For example, Dawes et al. (2007) designs an interesting experiment that 
isolates egalitarian motives. They find that people are willing to pay costs to achieve 
equal outcome even when there are no opportunities for reciprocity.  As we mentioned 
earlier, reciprocity can be positive or negative. This paper focuses on positive reciprocity 
                                                 
3 A fair payoff is defined as the average of the highest and lowest payoffs, excluding Pareto-dominated 
payoff pairs.  
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and inequality aversion.  We next describe research aimed at distinguishing these two 
motives4.   
For example, Cox (2004) designed a triadic game to sort out the motivations of 
investors and trustees in the trust game. To differentiate positive reciprocity from 
inequality aversion or other unconditional other-regarding preferences potentially held by 
the trustee, Cox compared trustees’ behavior in a standard trust game with a new 
treatment where the investors’ intentions are removed.  Investors in the new treatment are 
given an amount of money equal to the money the investors hold after making a transfer 
in the standard trust game, so that the payoff distributions before the trustees’ decisions 
are kept the same between the two treatments.  Cox finds that both inequality aversion 
and positive reciprocity can account for trustees’ return behavior.5 As discussed below, 
however, Cox’s study does not inform how trustees make decisions when reciprocity 
increases inequality. 
Charness and Haruvy (2002) conducted a gift-exchange experiment. They 
compared the employee’s decisions when the wage is given by the employer with the 
employee’s decision when the wage is randomly decided. They found that reciprocity, 
distributive concerns and altruistic considerations all play a significant role in employees’ 
decisions.  Also, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2008) study both positive and negative 
reciprocity in a moonlighting game where a player can take money from or pass money 
to her counterpart, who can either return money to or punish the player. They find that 
both reciprocity and inequality aversion play a role in decision making.  
                                                 
4 Interesting research differentiating inequality aversion from negative reciprocity such as punishment 
include Blount (1995), Brandts and Solà,(2001), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998), Fowler, et al. (2005) 
and Nelson, (2002). 
5 For related work, see also McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003); Charness (2004).  
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Most previous research, as we noted above, identifies the roles of equity and 
reciprocity motives by comparing a treatment that allows both reciprocity and inequality 
aversion to a treatment that excludes reciprocity motives. The data point to the 
importance of both equity and reciprocity. Such data, however, cannot and are not meant 
to tell how reciprocity and inequality aversion affect decision making when these two 
motivations are in conflict.   
To our knowledge, few studies of trust games have involved asymmetric investor 
and trustee endowments (see, e.g., Anderson, Mellor and Milyo, 2006; Brülhard and 
Usunier, 2007; Glaeser, et al., 2000; Greiner, Ockenfels and Werner, 2007; Johansson-
Stenman, Mahmud and Martinsson, 2005).  In principle, such studies could have included 
cases where a trustee faces conflicting equality and reciprocity motives. However, all of 
these studies focus on trust, without providing the necessary variations to compare 
trustees’ decisions when equality and reciprocity are in conflict against trustees’ 
decisions in cases where these two motives are mutually reinforcing.  
For example, in a trust game studied by Glaeser et al. (2000), an investor is given 
$15 and her trustee is given zero.  Any amount transferred from the investor to the trustee 
is doubled; therefore, when the investor transfers $5 or less, a reciprocal return from the 
trustee increases inequality.  Consequently, in this case the two motives are incompatible. 
Note, however, that this incompatibility occurs only when the trustee receives a transfer 
amount of $5 or less. For any transfer amount greater than $5, there is no incompatibility 
between equality and reciprocity motives.  
Because trustees’ wealth differs between the compatible/incompatible motives 
environments, this wealth effect constitutes a confounding element. That is, the 
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difference in trustees’ returns in the two environments could be due to the relative 
importance of the two motives, or to a wealth effect. The experiment we describe below 
is designed to avoid such confounds. It provides particularly clean evidence on decision 
making in environments where equality and reciprocity motives cannot be reconciled. 
 
III. Experiment Design 
We are interested in potential conflicts between positive reciprocity and inequity aversion.  
Trust games offer a good starting point for studying such conflicts. Our experiment 
consists of two treatments. Subjects participated in only one of the treatments. In the 
baseline treatment, similar to the standard trust game, the investor and the trustee are 
given equal endowments. In the asymmetric endowment treatment, however, the trustee 
is given a lesser endowment than the investor.  In this treatment, reciprocity and inequity 
aversion lead to very different decisions. Comparing trustees’ return amounts between 
these two treatments enables us to draw inferences about decision making in 
environments where reciprocity and inequality aversion are incompatible motives.  
 
III. A. Baseline Treatment 
In the baseline treatment, both the investor and the trustee are given 40E$ (experiment 
dollars; we used an exchange rate of 5E$=$1). The investor can transfer either 0E$ or 
10E$ to the trustee. If the investor transfers 10E$, then her trustee receives 30E$.  After 
observing the transfer amount, the trustee may send back an amount of money to her 
investor. The amount sent back can be any multiple of 5 between 0 and 30. The treatment 
is illustrated in Figure 1(A).  
  9
 Note that in this treatment, when the investor transfers 10E$, the trustee will have 
70E$ in hand, while the investor will have only 30E$. For this reason, any positive back- 
transfer amount less than or equal to 20E$ reduces earnings inequality and also results in 
the trustee earning at least as much as the investor (the investor and the trustee have equal 
earnings when the trustee returns 20E$.)  
 
III. B. Asymmetry treatment 
Our asymmetry treatment is identical to the baseline, with the exception that it endows 
the investor with 80E$.  The trustee still receives 40E$. This treatment is illustrated in 
Figure 1(B). If the investor transfers 10E$ to the trustee, and the trustee sends nothing 
back, then investor and trustee both earn 70E$. Therefore, any positive amount that the 
trustee returns to the investor increases earnings inequality to the trustee’s disadvantage. 
 
III. C. Expectation Elicitation  
We elicited both trustees’ and investors’ expectations after their decisions (samples of 
expectations surveys are provided in Appendix B.). Each investor who transferred 10E$, 
before being informed about the decision of her trustee, was asked to report the amount 
she believed the trustee would return, as well as the amount she believed the trustee 
should return. An investor earned an additional $1 if the amount her trustee returned 
matched the amount she reported she believed would be returned.  
In addition, trustees whose investors transferred 10E$ were asked to report their 
beliefs regarding how much their investors expected them to return, as well as what they 
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believed their investors believed they should return. Trustees were also rewarded 
according to the accuracy of their answers.  
 
III. D. Experiment Procedures 
Subjects were recruited at the University of Pennsylvania using the “Experiments @ 
Penn” web-based recruitment system. Each subject was randomly assigned the role of 
investor or trustee.   
Each subject was randomly assigned a letter as his or her ID for the duration of 
the experiment. Investors and trustees holding the same letter were paired together.  All 
subjects received an instruction sheet explaining the rules of the game.  Subjects were 
also given a test to ensure they understood the instructions. The game started after every 
subject answered the test correctly. 
Each subject played the game exactly once. Investors indicated their decisions on 
decision sheets, wrote their IDs on their decision sheets, and placed the sheets into a 
blank envelope. After all the investors finished, the experimenter collected all the 
envelopes and gave each trustee his or her investor’s envelope according to the ID. Each 
trustee saw her investor’s decision. If the investor transferred 10E$, the trustee then 
indicated his or her back-transfer decision on the decision sheet. Each subject was asked 
to fill out a survey (see Appendix B) after her decision. At the end of the experiment, 
subjects’ earnings were put into envelopes, each of which was marked with an ID letter. 
Each subject picked up his/her earnings envelope privately. Each subject received a $5 
show up bonus in addition to the money earned in the game and the survey ($12 on 
average). Subjects were in the lab about 40 minutes on average.  
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Next, we formally define reciprocity and inequality aversion.  For both treatments, 
we derive the behavioral predictions implied by these motives.  
 
IV. Reciprocity vs. Inequality Aversion 
 
IV. A. Inequality Aversion 
A trustee can make a decision only when an investor transfers 10E$. There is never a 
monetary incentive to return a positive amount. In the spirit of the inequality aversion 
model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), we say that a trustee’s backtransfer is consistent with 
an equality motive if: (1) it is less than the difference between x1 and x2, where x1 and x2 
are the amount the investor and the trustee receive after the investor decides to transfer 
10E$, respectively; and 2) it does not leave the trustee earning less than the investor 
(because trustees have a stronger aversion to disadvantageous inequality than 
advantageous inequality). Note that Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model implies that a zero 
return can be consistent with an equality motive in certain circumstances6. This type of 
inequality aversion, while theoretically possible, is uninteresting for practical purposes. 
Consequently, in our experiment, by inequality aversion we mean that one is willing to 
incur at least a 5E$ (or $1) cost to reduce advantageous earnings inequality. We use this 
definition because 5E$ is the smallest amount that can be sent to another player in our 
experiment.  
                                                 
6 Applying Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s model into our environment, the trustee’s utility for the allocation 
X=( x1 +y, x2-y) where y is the backtransfer of trustee is: 
U2(X)=x2-α2* max{ [(x1+y)- (x2-y)],0}- β2 *max {[(x2-y)- (x1+y)],0}, where 0≤ β2<1 and β2≤ α2. Following 
this formula, the trustee will return 
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The behavioral implications of an equality motive for trustees are straightforward. 
Consider first the decision of a trustee who has received 30E$. In the baseline trust game 
(where each party receives 40E$), a trustee motivated by equality should reduce earnings 
inequality by returning positive amounts up to 20E$. In the asymmetry treatment, 
however, the equality motive predicts that a trustee who has received 30E$ should return 
nothing. The reason is that any positive return will produce disadvantageous earnings 
inequality.  
The implications for the investor with an equality motive are less straightforward. 
If investors believe that trustees are inequality averse, then there is a range of possible 
back-transfers that may be chosen by trustees. An investor’s decision will depend on the 
subjective probability distribution she places on the backtransfers that an inequality 
averse trustee may choose.  Nevertheless, in the baseline and asymmetric treatments, both 
the decision to send 0E$ and the decision to send 10E$ can be reconciled with an equality 
motive, depending on the investor’s degree of inequality aversion and her beliefs about 
the trustee’s degree of inequality aversion. Thus, in contrast with the predictions for 
trustee behavior, the inequality motive does not provide sharp predictions regarding 
investor behavior in either treatment (and we will see in section IV. B that the same is 
true for investors who attribute a reciprocity motive to trustees.)  
To see the above point, consider first the (40E$, 40E$) baseline treatment. If an 
inequality averse investor believes her trustee will return 10E$ or less with probability 
one, then that investor will not transfer 10E$, because doing so will leave her earning 
40E$ or less, and this leads to disadvantageous inequality between the investor and her 
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trustee. On the other hand, if the investor expects the trustee will return 20E$ with 
probability one, then the investor will transfer 10E$.  
Consider next the treatment with asymmetric endowments (80E$, 40E$). Clearly, 
it can be the case that an inequality averse investor who also believes that her trustee is 
inequality averse (and therefore will send back nothing) might prefer to send 10E$ and 
achieve the equal earnings outcome. Recall, however, that in our experiment, sending 
10E$ is the only way for the investor to reduce her advantageous inequality. It is easy to 
see that investors could, in principle, be willing to sacrifice 5E$ to reduce inequality 
(consistent with our definition of inequality averse preferences), and yet still prefer to 
send 0E$ as compared to 10E$.  Given that the investors’ action space is limited, 
transfers of both 0E$ and 10E$ are consistent with an equity motive.  
 
IV. B. Positive Reciprocity  
Following McCabe et al. (2003), we say that a trustee’s backtransfer decision is 
consistent with a positive reciprocity motive if the trustee believes the investor’s decision 
was motivated by kindness (i.e., an intention to increase the trustee’s payoff). Hence, the 
trustee transfers back more than the minimum (which in our case is 0E$). It is necessary 
to clarify two points regarding this definition.  
 First, it is routine to posit that reciprocally-motivated trustees in standard trust 
environments, such as our baseline game, will interpret a positive offer as a kind act.  It 
has been suggested that any positive transfer will be interpreted as kind, including cases 
in which the investor expects a substantial return (e.g., 2/3 of the transfer amount). The 
reason is that the investor takes a risk that is very likely to increase the trustee’s monetary 
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payoff (Camerer, 2003). In the context of our asymmetric treatment, where the investor 
has a larger endowment than the trustee, this argument has even greater force. In 
particular, the trustee in the asymmetric environment would not likely believe that the 
investor wanted a greater return than in the symmetric environment. To the contrary, the 
trustee probably believes the investor to expect less (indeed, this is what our data suggest.)  
Consequently, as noted by Rabin (1993),a trustee would perceive the investor’s transfer 
in the asymmetric context as a kinder action than when they believe the transfer was 
motivated by the investor’s desire to maximize her own profit, as in the symmetric 
endowment case (see also Charness and Haruvy, 2002, for a discussion of this point).  
In this paper, we adopt a more conservative approach and assume that 
reciprocally-motivated trustees in both treatments will associate the same degree of 
kindness to an investor’s decision to transfer 10E$.  Since our minimal definition of 
positive reciprocity does not distinguish between degrees of perceived kindness of 
transfer, we predict the same positive returns in both treatments.  A stronger reciprocity 
model would instead predict that in the asymmetry treatment the back-transfer would be 
no less and probably more than what it would be in the (40, 40) case.   
A second point to make with respect to our definition is that, as noted by Cox 
(2004), positive returns in trust games can be motivated by factors (altruism being one) 
other than reciprocity. What we want to stress here is that a zero return is inconsistent 
with reciprocity, whereas a positive return is consistent with some degree of reciprocity. 7   
                                                 
7 Our definition of positive returns as reciprocity is the weakest possible form of reciprocity. For example,  
if we were to adopt the kindness definition of Rabin (1993), then the trustee, to be viewed as kind, needs to 
return more than 15E$ (the average of the highest and the lowest amount the investor could get). Our 
weaker definition maximizes the probability of finding reciprocal behavior in the asymmetry treatment. Yet 
we found that reciprocity diminishes significantly when it conflicts with equity.  
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In view of the above discussion, it follows that trustees motivated only by positive 
reciprocity should return a positive amount in both treatments, and the returned amounts 
should be the same on average in each treatment. As to investors, predicting their 
decisions would require knowing their subjective probability distribution over the 
trustees’ possible backtransfers. For example, investors would be expected to send 10E$ 
if they believe they will receive a return of at least 10E$ with probability of one. 
However, if the investor believes the backtransfer will be 5E$ with probability one, then 
she will send 0E$.8  Thus, depending on the expectations investors hold, transfers of both 
0E$ and 10E$ can be reconciled with the investor’s assumption of a reciprocity motive. 
 
IV. C. Summary of Predictions  
It is worthwhile to summarize the predictions we can derive from assuming different 
motives. The standard model based on purely selfish preferences predicts that in both 
treatments, the trustee will send nothing back. Thus, the investor who expects such 
behavior should send nothing. This prediction differs from the predictions of the two 
social preference models we discussed, and those predictions in turn differ from each 
other.  
A summary of the predictions of each theory in the two treatments is provided in 
Table 1. Because any investor decision (i.e., a transfer of either 0E$ or 10E$) in either 
treatment can be reconciled with both models, Table 1 includes only predictions 
regarding trustees’ decisions. The table clearly shows that it is only in the asymmetric 
                                                 
8 We obtained data on how much each investor believes her trustee will return if the investor transfers 10E$. 
However, we did not obtain data on the level of confidence that they placed in their answers, so we cannot 
easily test whether the relationship between expectations and transfer decisions is consistent with positive 
reciprocity. The same is of course true for our ability to use these data to test inequality aversion.  
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endowment treatment where the implications of a reciprocity motive sharply conflict with 
inequality aversion.   
 
V. Results 
We obtained observations on 144 subjects: 34 pairs in the baseline treatment and 38 pairs 
in the asymmetry treatment. We begin by reporting the expectations and decisions of 
investors, and then proceed to analyze those of trustees.  
 
V. A. Investors’ decisions and expectations 
With respect to the decision to transfer money, the percentage of investors who 
transferred 10E$ is not significantly different between the baseline and the asymmetry 
treatment (60.5% vs. 64.7%, respectively, p=0.72, Mann-Whitney two-tail test). However, 
the investors expect less to be returned on average in the asymmetry treatment. This can 
be seen in Figure 2, which shows the distribution of expected returns among those 
investors who transferred 10E$9.   
As shown in Figure 2, among the 22 investors who transferred 10E$ in the 
baseline, only about 23% expected a 0E$ back-transfer. In contrast, about 61% of the 23 
investors who transferred 10E$ expected a 0E$ back-transfer in the asymmetry treatment. 
The difference is significant (p=0.01, Mann-Whitney two-tail test). Furthermore, 
compared with the baseline, significantly fewer investors in the asymmetry treatment 
expected their trustees to return at least 10E$, the amount required for the investors to 
avoid a loss (77% vs. 22%, p<0.01, Mann-Whitney two-tail test). While no investor 
expected a backtransfer of more than 15E$ in the asymmetry treatment, more than one-
                                                 
9 Only investors who transferred 10 were asked to report their expected return amount.  
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third of investors (36%) expected a back-transfer of 20E$ in the baseline, the symmetry 
treatment.  
 These data have clear implications for the models discussed above. First, nearly 
2/3 of investors in both treatments send a positive amount. Therefore, the standard theory 
that assumes selfishness does not fit most of our data. Second, although sending is in 
principle consistent with both inequality aversion and reciprocity models, the fact that the 
majority of investors who send in the asymmetry treatment expect no return from trustees 
argues for the importance of the former.10 
 
V. B. Trustee’s Decisions and Expectations 
Figure 3 plots the backtransfer of the trustees whose investors transferred 10E$. As 
investors expected, significantly more trustees returned nothing in the asymmetry 
treatment than in the baseline treatment (61% vs. 32%, p=0.05, Mann-Whitney two-tail 
test). In addition, more than half (55%) of the trustees returned at least 10E$ in the 
baseline, while only about 26% returned the transfer amount in the asymmetry treatment 
(p=0.05, Mann-Whitney two tail test). Finally, consider the proportion of trustees who 
returned more than 15E$. Nine of 22 trustees (41%) did so (returned exactly 20E$) in the 
baseline treatment, but only 1 of the 23 trustees (4%) made this decision in the 
asymmetry treatment.  
 It is worthwhile to emphasize that no trustee in the baseline treatment returned 
more than 20E$ to the investors (an amount that would leave the investor earning more 
than the trustee.) Yet, about 40% of trustees in the asymmetry treatment returned more 
                                                 
10 This behavior might also be consistent with altruism, although we should then explain why investors do 
not also expect the same motivation in trustees. Inequality aversion offers a more satisfactory explanation 
of our data. 
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than 0E$, which runs counter to the predictions of an inequity aversion motive. On the 
other hand, the average back-transfer among trustees who returned a positive amount is 
significantly lower in the asymmetry than in the baseline treatment (9.4 vs. 16.0, p=0.01, 
Mann-Whitney two-tail test). This is consistent with the view that back-transfers in both 
treatments are motivated in part by reciprocity, while the inequality aversion motive 
encourages positive back-transfer decisions only in the baseline treatment.  
 The distribution of trustees’ beliefs regarding investors’ expected returns in our 
two treatments is plotted in Figure 4, and displays patterns similar to those of back-
transfers. About 60% of trustees believe their investors expect a 0E$ back-transfer in the 
asymmetry treatment. Only 14% trustees hold this belief in the baseline. Also, in the 
baseline, about 92% of trustees believe investors expect a return of at least 10E$, and 
32% believe investors expect more than 15E$. In the asymmetry treatment the 
proportions are 26% and 4%, respectively11.  
 In Figure 5, we also plot the distribution of trustee’s beliefs about what investors 
think trustees should return (we refer to them as the normative expectations of return, 
Bicchieri 2006). Interestingly, in the asymmetry treatment, only about 1/3 of the trustees 
think their investors believe they should return 0E$. About 65% trustees think the 
investors believe they should return at least 10E$. One trustee thinks the investor’s 
normative expectation is 20E$ and two trustees think 30E$ is the investors’ normative 
expectation. In contrast, all trustees in the baseline treatment think the investors believe 
                                                 
11 It is interesting that the distribution of trustee’s backtransfers is identical to the trustee’s belief regarding 
their investor’s expected return. However, this does not mean the choice and the belief coincide for any 
particular individual. In particular, nine of 23 trustees’ decisions are at odds with their beliefs. Five 
transferred less than their reported belief about the investor’s expected return. In the baseline treatment, 
sixteen of 22 trustees reported a belief about the investors’ expected return different from their actual back-
transfer. Among these, nine trustees transferred back less then the amount they believed their investors 
would expect them to return.  
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they should return at least 10E$ and 82% trustees think the investors believe they should 
return more than 20E$. Again, we see that trustees in the asymmetry treatment believe 
their investors think they should return less than in the baseline treatment.  
 It is useful to summarize the relationship between the three motives behind 
trustees’ behavior that we have discussed and the data obtained in our experiment. This is 
found in Table 2. 
 In summary, we find that a majority of trustees do not reciprocate the investors’ 
transfer when reciprocity conflicts with equality. On the other hand, as has been 
previously shown in the standard trust game, a majority of trustees return a positive 
amount when reciprocity reduces inequality. In addition, in the asymmetry treatment we 
do find positive backtransfers consistent with reciprocity and in violation of equity, but 
the average amount of these positive backtransfers is significantly lower than in the 
baseline treatment. Moreover, investors expect less to be returned in the asymmetry 
treatment than in the baseline treatment, and most trustees also believe that investors 
expect a 0E$ return in the asymmetry treatment.  
 
VI. Discussion 
This paper presents the first systematic investigation of how people behave when 
reciprocity cannot be reconciled with equality in decision environments. In a trust game, 
more trustees refuse to reciprocate investors’ kindness when reciprocity violates equity 
than when reciprocity reduces inequality. Moreover, investors evidently expect this will 
be the case. More investors expect trustees to choose equity over reciprocity when the 
two are in conflict than when they have consistent behavioral consequences. Trustees 
  20
also believe investors expect a relatively smaller return when trustees are required to 
sacrifice equity in order to reciprocate.  
 The question raised by our data is why more trustees choose not to reciprocate 
when doing so increases inequality. One explanation could be the presence of a “self-
serving bias”, i.e., the tendency of individual’s judgments to be biased towards self-
interest (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997). According to the self-serving bias explanation, 
when reciprocity cannot be reconciled with equality, an individual will tend to follow the 
motive that best fulfills her own self-interest (in our case, to maximize monetary payoff). 
Thus, in our asymmetry treatment, a self-serving bias would lead a trustee to choose 
equity. The fact that positive reciprocity increases inequality becomes an excuse for the 
trustee to maximize earnings. Such an excuse is not available in the baseline treatment.  
 Our results have important implications for institution design. In a principal-agent 
relationship, eliciting positive reciprocity provides a way to avoid problems that might 
otherwise arise when contracts are incomplete (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Fehr et al. (1998) 
reports a gift exchange experiment that shows that when firms offer a “gift” of an above-
market wage, workers reciprocate by providing relatively more effort than when the wage 
is lower (competitive). This suggests that reciprocity could be a solution to moral hazard 
problems. Our results, however, imply that such a solution would have important 
limitations. In particular, when employers are wealthier or have more resources than 
employees, which is very often the case in the real world, our results suggest that 
reciprocity motives can be significantly weakened. In particular, employees might not 
provide a proportionally higher effort when the employer offers a high wage. In light of 
the importance of reciprocity in building long-run exchange relationships, our findings 
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raise an important question: how does one build a culture of reciprocity when 
reciprocation increases immediate inequality? 
 One approach could be to focus people on a reciprocity norm (Cialdini et al. 1990; 
Bicchieri 2000, 2006). Previous research shows that people often follow what they expect 
others will do,  even when others’ decisions are irrelevant to their own material payoffs 
(see, Cason and Mui, 1998; Bardsley and Sausgruber, 2005; Bicchieri and Xiao, 2007; 
Krupka and Weber, 2007). This suggests that publicly emphasizing reciprocating 
behavior could increase an individual’s tendency to reciprocate. For example, publicly 
rewarding loyal employees not only provides an incentive for high effort but also offers 
clear evidence that other workers do work hard. This can have the effect of increasing 
other workers’ efforts.  
 Society is clearly complex. Predicting individuals’ decisions in different contexts 
and designing efficient institutions requires not only the ability to identify different 
motives, but also the equally important capability to understand the impact and 
interaction of different motives in different contexts. A growing amount of research has 
been conducted recently along these lines (e.g. Engelmann and Strobel, 2004; Fehr, et al. 
2006). This paper can be seen as another step toward this goal.  
 We have focused on positive reciprocity and inequality aversion. We did not 
address the question of how people behave when negative reciprocity and equity conflict. 
For example, subjects are routinely found to punish misbehavior even when it is costly to 
them. It has been pointed out that such costly punishment plays an important role in 
supporting social norms (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2002). Useful future research will 
address whether inequality aversion reduces people’s willingness to punish in those cases 
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where costly punishment leaves the punishers worse off than those who receive the 
punishment. Our ongoing research investigates these important topics. 
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Table 1. A summary of theory predictions 
Treatment Motivation Trustee’s return(E$) if 
receives 30E$ 
Payoff Maximization 0 
Inequality Aversion (0, 20] 
Baseline 
Reciprocity (0, 30] 
Payoff Maximization 0 
Inequality Aversion 0 
Asymmetry 
Reciprocity (0, 30] 
 
Table 2. Number of trustees’ whose decisions are consistent with each motive 
Treatment Motivation # of Trustees 
Payoff Maximization 7 
Inequality Aversion 15 
Baseline 
Reciprocity 15 
Payoff Maximization 14 
Inequality Aversion 14 
Asymmetry 
Reciprocity 9 
 
Note: This table includes data only from trustees who received 30E$. 
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T = 0 
Figure 1.  Two treatments 
(A). Baseline treatment 
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B). Asymmetry treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: T –investor’s transfer amount; BT—trustee’s back transfer amount. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of the trustees’ back transfer 
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Figure 4. Distribution of trustee’s belief of investor’s expected backtransfer 
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Figure 5. Distribution of trustees’ beliefs of investors’ normative expectation of return 
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Appendix A. Instructions of asymmetry treatment 
1. Investor’s instruction 
You are Actor 1 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
 
Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the 
session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read 
these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a question 
please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in this room. You will never be 
informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, your matched 
participant will never be informed about your identity. You are in the role of Actor 1 and your matched 
participant will be referred to as your Actor 2. You and your Actor 2 will participate only once in this 
decision problem. All the decisions will be anonymous. 
 
This is how the experiment works. 
 
Endowment 
At the beginning of the experiment, each Actor 1 receives an initial endowment of 80 E$ (experimental 
dollars, which are converted to US Dollars at the rate of 5E$ = 1 US Dollar). Each Actor 2 receives an 
initial endowment of 40 E$. 
 
Your decision 
 
You, as Actor 1, can decide whether to transfer 0E$ or 10E$ from your endowment to Actor 2. The 
experimenters will triple this transferred amount, so that Actor 2 receives three times the amount of E$ you 
transferred. 
 
The decision of Actor 2  
After your decision, Actor 2 will decide to transfer back to you (Actor 1) some amount of the tripled 
transfer amount he/she got. The amount Actor 2 transfers back to Actor 1 can be any multiple of 5 between 
0 and the tripled transfer amount (0 and the tripled transfer amount included).   
If you transferred 0E$, Actor 2 cannot transfer back any amount to you. 
If you transferred 10E$ to Actor 2, Actor 2 will get 30E$. Actor 2 then can transfer back to you: 0E$, 5E$, 
10E$, 15E$, 20E$, 25E$ or 30E$. 
 
Payoffs 
 
You (Actor 1) receive: 80 E$ – transfer to Actor 2 + back-transfer from Actor 2. 
Actor 2 receives: 40E$+ (3 × transfer from Actor 1) – back-transfer to Actor 1 
  
Exchange rate: For every 5E$ you earn you will be paid $1. 
 
All the possible payoffs are listed in the table below: 
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Payoff (E$) If Actor 1 chose to 
transfer…(E$) 
Actor 2 receives … 
(E$) 
If Actor 2 chose to 
transfer back…(E$) Actor 1 Actor 2 
0 0 0 80 40 
0 70 70 
5 75 65 
10 80 60 
15 85 55 
20 90 50 
25 85 45 
10 30 
30 100 40 
 
How the experiment is conducted 
 
Step 1: Random and anonymous assignment of counterparts  
Each of you has randomly chosen a manila envelope.  Your ID letter is shown on the last page of the 
instructions.  Persons in this room who get the same ID will be paired. Please do not show anyone your ID 
letter. 
 
Step 2: You choose the option 
You will make your decision by filling in the decision sheet on your table.  After making the decision, you 
will also need to write the letter ID on the decision sheet, and then put it into your envelope. After every 
Actor 1 has finished, an experimenter will collect all the envelopes. 
 
Step 3: Actor 2 makes the decision. 
The experimenter will give each Actor 1’s decision sheet to his/her Actor 2 according to the ID.  Actor 2 
will see the decision made by his/her Actor 1. If you transferred 10E$ to your Actor 2, Actor 2 then decides 
how much of the 30E$ (3×10) to transfer back to you by filling in the decision sheet. After finishing this, 
Actor 2 puts the decision sheet back into an envelope. After each Actor 2 has finished, an experimenter will 
collect all the envelopes. 
 
Step 4: Receive cash payment privately 
The experimenter will return to you the decision sheet and you will see your Actor 2’s decision. The 
experimenter will calculate the earnings of each Actor 1 and each Actor 2. The experimenter will put each 
participant’s earnings in an envelope marked with her/his ID letter. Each Actor 1 will pick up the envelope 
labeled with her/his letter ID one by one. After all the Actor 1s have been paid and left the lab, every Actor 
2 will be paid in the same way. 
 
Actor 1 and Actor 2 will remain anonymously matched at all times during the experiment.   
 
End of Instructions 
 
 
 
Your ID:___________ 
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2. Trustee’s instruction 
 
You are Actor 2 
Description of Your Decision Problem 
 
Thank you for coming! You've earned $5 for showing up on time. Whatever you earn in the rest of the 
session will be in addition to this $5. The instructions explain how you can make decisions. Please read 
these instructions carefully! There is no talking at any time during this experiment. If you have a question 
please raise your hand, and an experimenter will assist you. 
 
You will be randomly and anonymously paired with another person in this room. You will never be 
informed of the identity of this person, either during or after the experiment. Similarly, your matched 
participant will never be informed about your identity. You are in the role of Actor 2 and your matched 
participant will be referred to as your Actor 1. You and your Actor 1 will participate only once in this 
decision problem. All the decisions will be anonymous. 
 
This is how the experiment works. 
 
Endowment 
At the beginning of the experiment, each Actor 1 receives an initial endowment of 80 E$ (experimental 
dollars, which are converted to US Dollars at the rate of 5E$ = 1 US Dollar). Each Actor 2 receives an 
initial endowment of 40 E$. 
 
The decision of Actor 1 
 
Actor 1 can decide whether to transfer 0E$ or 10E$ from his/her endowment to you. The experimenters 
will triple this transferred amount, so that you receive three times the amount of E$ Actor 1 transferred. 
 
Your decision  
After Actor 1’s decision, you will decide to transfer back to Actor 1 some amount of the tripled transfer 
amount you got. The amount you transfer back to Actor 1 can be any multiple of 5 between 0 and the 
tripled transfer amount (0 and the tripled transfer amount included).  
If Actor 1 transferred 0E$, you cannot transfer back any amount to Actor 1. 
If Actor 1 transferred 10E$ to you, you will get 30E$. You then can transfer back to Actor 1: 0E$, 5E$, 
10E$, 15E$, 20E$, 25E$ or 30E$. 
 
Payoffs 
 
Actor 1 receives: 80 E$ – transfer to Actor 2 + back-transfer from Actor 2. 
You (Actor 2) receive: 40E$+(3 × transfer from Actor 1) –back-transfer to Actor 1  
 
Exchange rate: For every 5E$ you earn you will be paid $1. 
 
All the possible payoffs are listed in the table below: 
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Payoff (E$) If Actor 1 chose to 
transfer…(E$) 
Actor 2 receives … 
(E$) 
If Actor 2 chose to 
transfer back…(E$) Actor 1 Actor 2 
0 0 0 80 40 
0 70 70 
5 75 65 
10 80 60 
15 85 55 
20 90 50 
25 85 45 
10 30 
30 100 40 
 
How the experiment is conducted 
 
Step 1: Random and anonymous assignment of counterparts  
Each of you has randomly chosen a manila envelope.  Your ID letter is shown on the last page of the 
instructions.  Persons in this room who get the same ID will be paired. Please do not show anyone your ID 
letter. 
 
Step 2: Actor 1 chooses the option 
Actor 1 will make his/her decision by filling in the decision sheet on his/her table. Below is a sample 
decision sheet. After making the decision, he/she will also need to write the letter ID on the decision sheet, 
and then put it into his/her envelope. After every Actor 1 has finished, an experimenter will collect all the 
envelopes. 
Sample Decision Sheet 
ID:__________ 
Payoff Table 
Payoff (E$) If Actor 1 chose to 
transfer…(E$) 
Actor 2 
receives … (E$) 
If Actor 2 chose to 
transfer back…(E$) Actor 1 Actor 2 
0 0 0 80 40 
0 70 70 
5 75 65 
10 80 60 
15 85 55 
20 90 50 
25 95 45 
10 30 
30 100 40 
 
Please check your decision here: 
Actor 1 
 _____ I will transfer 0 E$ to Actor 2 
 _____ I will transfer 10E$ to Actor 2.  
 Actor 2 
 I will transfer back   _____   0  E$ 
     _____   5 E$ 
     _____  10 E$ 
     _____  15 E$ 
     _____  20 E$ 
     _____  25 E$ 
                                          _____  30 E$ 
  36
 
Step 3: You (Actor 2) make the decision. 
The experimenter will give each Actor 1’s decision sheet to his/her Actor 2 according to the ID.  You will 
see the decision made by your Actor 1. If Actor 1 transferred 10E$ to you, you will decide how much to 
transfer back to Actor 1 by filling in the decision sheet. After finishing this, you will put the decision sheet 
back into an envelope. After each Actor 2 has finished an experimenter will collect all the envelopes. 
 
Step 4: Receive cash payment privately 
The experimenter will return to each Actor 1 the decision sheet and Actor 1 will see Actor 2’s decision. 
The experimenter will calculate the earnings of each Actor 1 and each Actor 2. The experimenter will put 
each participant’s earnings in an envelope marked with her/his ID letter. Each Actor 1 will pick up the 
envelope labeled with her/his letter ID one by one. After all the Actor 1s have been paid and left the lab, 
every Actor 2 will be paid in the same way. 
 
Actor 1 and Actor 2 will remain anonymously matched at all times during the experiment.  
 
End of Instructions 
 
Your ID:___________ 
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Appendix B. Surveys 
1. Investor’s survey 
Please write down your ID________    Gender_______ (Actor 1) 
Please answer the following questions. You can earn extra money depending on your answers. 
 
Please Note: To answer some of the questions below you need to know that there are ______ Actor 1s 
in this room.  Write on the back of the paper if you need more space. 
 
 
• How did you make your decisions? 
 
 
• How many Actor1s in this room do you believe transferred 10 E$?   
(If your answer is the same as the actual number, you will earn an additional $1) 
 
If you transferred 10 E$, please answer the following questions.  
 
• How much do you think Actor 2 WILL return to you?  
  (If your answer is the same as the actual number, you will earn an additional $1) 
 
• How much do you think Actor 2 SHOULD return to you? 
 
2. Trustee’s survey 
Please write down your ID________    Gender_______ (Actor 2) 
Please answer the following questions. You can earn extra money depending on your answers. 
 
• How did you make your decisions? 
 
 
• Please fill the following blank spaces if Actor 1 transferred 10E$ to you. 
 
⎯  Actor 1 thought you would return ____ E$. 
(If your answer is the same as what your Actor 1 wrote on his/her survey before he/she knew your final 
decision, you will earn an additional $1). 
 
 
⎯ Actor 1 thought you should return ___E$. 
(If your answer is the same as what your Actor 1 wrote on his/her survey before he/she knew your final 
decision, you will earn an additional $1). 
 
 
• Among the Actor 2s whose Actor 1s transferred 10E$, which back-transfer amount do you 
believe most of those Actor2s chose today.  
(If your answer is the same as the actual number, you will earn an additional $1) 
 
  Transfer back________E$ 
